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to, accepting that inevitability (116–29). What is notable is that he simply
takes for granted the truth of Feurebach’s assumption that death is the end,
that there is no conscious survival beyond death. Having a religious belief
is in this case, reduced to having a certain attitude to the agreed-on facts as
they are stated in a naturalistic metaphysics such as Feuerbach’s. I suspect
that Phillips’ ideal of neutrality is not really a coherent one; and this suspi-
cion is somewhat encouraged by the fact that Phillips himself, rather than
simply contemplating the differences between religious and naturalistic
perspectives, ends up reducing the former so that they offer no challenge
to the truth of the latter.  
NOTES
1. For a detailed argument in favour of this view of philosophy, see
Phillips’ Philosophy’s Cool Place (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1999).
2. There are actually circumstances in which I would be willing to say that
music does make truth-claims. But I don’t think Phillips is intending the analo-
gy to be taken in this sense.
On Augustine, by Sharon M. Kaye and Paul Thomson.  Wadsworth, 2001.
Pp 83. Paper $15.95; On Ockham, by Sharon M. Kaye and Robert M. Martin.
Wadsworth, 2001. Pp. 97. Paper $15.95.  
JACK ZUPKO, Emory University
These two very short books offer basic introductions to the thought of
Augustine and William of Ockham.  They are part of the Wadsworth
Philosophers Series under the general editorship of Daniel Kolak, a collec-
tion now comprising some forty volumes aimed at providing “a brief and
accessible insight into the ideas of major philosophers throughout history
… empowering the reader to better understand the original works of these
influential figures” (from the back cover).  Although these books are
intended as stand-alone texts, the publisher suggests that they would also
be “excellent companions to, and may be bundled with, Daniel Kolak’s The
Philosophy Source, a CD-ROM that provides ready access to over 100 classic,
primary readings.”  I have not examined the latter text for this review.
I mention this because the most important thing to know about these
books is that they are written for students as opposed to specialist scholars or
professional philosophers or even academics in other fields, a fact not imme-
diately clear from the books themselves.  The prose is spartan and reads like
a revised set of lecture notes, complete with the sort of hip, off-the-wall allu-
sions undergraduate students find appealing: “the [Pyrrhonian] skeptic
would ask what color the book would appear to a Venusian equipped with
infra-red vision, or to Superman with x-ray eyes, or when viewed under
ultra-violet light” (On Augustine: 28); “Ockham’s view [on freedom] res-
onates well with that of the twentieth-century libertarian, Jean-Paul Sartre
(1905-1980).  We are what we make ourselves to be” (On Ockham: 70).  At a
certain level, it is hard to know what to make of such remarks.  But anyone
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who is familiar with the classroom knows that a little distortion in the direc-
tion of simplification is sometimes necessary if one is to be an effective
teacher.  I am reminded of J. L. Austin’s great example, ‘France is hexagonal’
– is this statement true or false?  “It is just rough,” Austin says, “and that is
the right and final answer to the question of the relation of ‘France is hexago-
nal’ to France” (How to Do Things with Words, Lecture XI).  And that is what
we have here: a pair of rough guides designed to help students as they read
Augustine and Ockham for the first time.
I believe the books are largely successful in this aim.  They hit most of
the points that should be hit in the Augustine and Ockham units of a typi-
cal undergraduate course on medieval philosophy.  The organization is
thematic, though somewhat piecemeal.  The Augustine volume, for exam-
ple, moves briskly through Augustine’s life and times, theodicy (including
the doctrines of grace and original sin), knowledge, view of ‘the inner
man’, ethics, and political theory, all in a mere eighty pages.  Most of the
discussion involves saying what Augustine’s view is and explaining it by
means of quotations, analogies, examples, and other pedagogical devices.
There is little in the way of critical discussion or argumentation that might
engage someone who already knows a bit about Augustine, let alone
someone who knows his way around the texts.  Readers in these categories
would be better served by some of the excellent encyclopedia articles on
Augustine – e.g., in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy or The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy – or by collections of recent scholarship, e.g., The
Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth Matthews (California 1999), or The
Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann (Cambridge 2003).  Likewise, if one is looking for a brief, syn-
optic overview which captures the general flavor of Augustine’s thought, it
is hard to do better than Henry Chadwick’s Augustine (Oxford 1986).
To its credit, On Augustine does not try to duplicate any of these
approaches, but focuses resolutely on its student audience.  For example, on
the topic of sense perception, the authors describe Augustine’s view in rela-
tion to three traditional models of the mind-body relation – interactionism,
parallelism, and epiphenomenalism – each of which is briefly explained.
After showing that none of these is compatible with Augustine’s
Neoplatonic conception of causality, a fourth alternative is introduced,
which they dub ‘reverse-epiphenomenalism,’ according to which the soul
can exercise causal power over the body, but not vice versa (38-39).
Augustine’s conception of the metaphysical status of the human soul is thus
brought into conversation with a range of other positions which students
can easily understand and probably will have heard of elsewhere.
Some illustrations, however, struck me as more likely to mislead than
edify.  Although it is true that both Augustine and David Hume take seri-
ously the role of the emotions in human life, it is not helpful to be told that
Hume champions the Augustinian idea that “reason is the slave of the pas-
sions” (69).  This is the natural condition of the psyche for Hume; it goes
hand in hand with his skepticism and atheism.  For Augustine, however,
the intellect is supposed to be in charge of the soul; we find ourselves
enslaved by passion precisely because we are being punished for our mis-
deeds in the Garden.  These are very different explanations that just hap-
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pen to arrive at the same conclusion. 
The authors could also have been more generous in revealing the scrip-
tural allusions running through so much of what Augustine says.  In a pas-
sage from De Doctrina Christiana, the phrase “the invisible attributes of
God, which are understood through what has been made,” is placed in
quotation marks, but its source is not identified as Romans 1:20, an
absolutely crucial passage as far as Augustine’s vision of Christian philoso-
phy is concerned.  Conversely, names are dropped from out of nowhere.
The empiricist problem of self-justification is duly noted, and then capped
by the gratuitous observation that finding a non-empiricist proof of empiri-
cism “is precisely the project that occupies a prominent contemporary
empiricist, Bas C. van Fraassen (1941-  ),” about whom nothing more is
said (31).  This belongs in a footnote.  Elsewhere, the discussion of
Augustine on time is interrupted by what looks to be nothing less than a
plug for another book: “A reader interested in a comparative study should
consult Eva Brann’s What, Then, is Time?, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
This book contains a comparative discussion of Augustine and Husserl,
and covers many other major theorists about time, including Plato,
Aristotle, Plotinus, Newton, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Einstein, and
Heidegger” (56).  Again, if this must be mentioned, better to do it in a foot-
note rather than breaking so obtrusively into the text.
On Ockham exhibits many of the same virtues and shortcomings as On
Augustine, though it is more successful at giving the reader a sense of the
philosophical style of its subject.  The authors correctly present Ockham’s
nominalism as a way of doing philosophy built on a new way of doing
logic as opposed to a cluster of doctrines denying the existence of real uni-
versals or a quasi-moral commitment to avoid multiplying entities.  The
latter are properly consequences of nominalism rather than its defining char-
acteristics.  The authors are exactly right to point out that “Ockham became
convinced that a great number of hopeless confusions arise when philoso-
phers fail to understand how language works,” though this is followed by
the remark, “so he elaborated a whole system of logic that supports the
thesis that universals do not exist outside the mind” (36), which gets it
backwards.  Universals are superfluous for Ockham because he thinks his
theory of supposition can account for the reference of common terms and
concepts using only particular substances and qualities, not because he has
an antecedent commitment to eliminating them.  
As with On Augustine, there are places where helpful and I would have
thought obvious allusions are inexplicably missed.  Ockham’s illustrious
Franciscan predecessor Duns Scotus should have been mentioned instead
of Thomas Aquinas in connection with infinite regress proofs for the exis-
tence of God, especially since it is Scotus’s famous Parisian Proof to which
Ockham is responding (51).  (By the way, members of itinerant orders like
the Franciscans are friars, not “monks” (2); monks live in monasteries.)
Equally worrisome is the statement that “Ockham is virtually alone among
medieval philosophers in rejecting compatibilism” (66).  Didn’t Scotus
(inspired by Anselm) provide the archetypal model of free voluntary
action in terms of the will’s twofold inclination to justice and its own
advantage?  There are also oversimplifications that, given the nature of the
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book, seem somewhat churlish to mention here, such as the way sensory
cognition is likened to “what a camera is capable of,” and then immediate-
ly ascribed to brute animals.  For an Aristotelian such as Ockham, there
would be all the difference in the world between an animal’s power of sen-
sory cognition and a camera’s power to record images.  A camera is not
alive, nor do the images it receives cause it to move from place to place.
On the whole these are useful books, admirable in the fact that they are
written with a student audience in mind.  For the reasons sketched above,
however, and also because of differences in teaching style, instructors will
want to use them judiciously.  
The books could have benefited from more careful copyediting.  There
are an unusually high number of typographical errors, and the referencing
system is awkward and inconsistent, perhaps because of an editorial deci-
sion to avoid footnotes.
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